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Abstract
In an economic market, sellers, infomediaries and
customers constitute an economic network. Each
seller has her own customer group and the seller’s
private customers are unobservable to other sell-
ers. Therefore, a seller can only sell commodities
among her own customers unless other sellers or in-
fomediaries share her sale information to their cus-
tomer groups. However, a seller is not incentivized
to share others’ sale information by default, which
leads to inefficient resource allocation and limited
revenue for the sale. To tackle this problem, we de-
velop a novel mechanism called customer sharing
mechanism (CSM) which incentivizes all sellers to
share each other’s sale information to their private
customer groups. Furthermore, CSM also incen-
tivizes all customers to truthfully participate in the
sale. In the end, CSM not only allocates the com-
modities efficiently but also optimizes the seller’s
revenue.
1 Introduction
In many markets such as online shopping platforms, there are
multiple sellers and many potential customers. Each seller
has her own customer group and different seller’s customer
groups may not overlap. The interactive relationships among
these sellers and customer groups form an economic network.
For example, in online search engines or social media plat-
forms (e.g., Google, Twitter, WordPress), it is common to see
various ads from some commodity sellers. These social me-
dia platforms usually have their own customers which could
be the registered users or those who often browse these plat-
forms. By advertising in these platforms, a seller could en-
large her selling quantity and at the same time, the platforms
also increase its profit from these paid advertisements. Sup-
ply chain system is an another example, every dealer in the
system serves a local customer group that is geographically
close to her and usually if a dealer is not a terminal retail
trader, she may have secondary dealers. Based on commer-
cial contracts, the dealers in the system form an economic
network where each edge represents the relationship between
supply and marketing. Other similar economic interactions
also emerge in logistics, routing and job-hunting networks.
When one seller (or advertiser, dealer) wants to sell her own
commodity for a good price, without inviting other sellers to
become mediators for her and diffuse the sale information
in the economic network, usually she can only sell among
customers that she can directly inform, although it would be
very likely that a high price bidder hides in another seller’s
customer group. As a consequence, this results in a locally
optimal allocation and the seller’s revenue cannot be glob-
ally maximized. Such a sub-optimal allocation scenario is
very common in many real-world markets. Even in non-
competitive markets where the sellers are not rivals to each
other, a seller’s local sale information is hard to be shared by
other sellers.
The underlying reason for such inefficiency is mainly due
to the fact that sharing others’ sale information could be
costly. The information sharing action itself is usually cost-
less, for example, a sharer can do it by posting the sales in-
formation via twitter or facebook. However, a more impor-
tant cost could potentially exist. In the economic networks,
if a high bid buyer is not a member of the seller’s direct cus-
tomer group, to find this buyer and complete a sale with a
globally optimized revenue, a trading chain from the seller
to the winning buyer via one or multiple information sharers
must be established. Every seller or infomediary along the
chain could have a cost, for example the costs for shipping
the commodity. For intermediate sellers who are selling the
same or similar commodities, this cost could be their potential
customer loss; for those noncompetitive intermediate sellers
or infomediaries, the costs could simply be monetary com-
mission demands, the information handling fee or transporta-
tion/labor costs for shipping the commodity. It is important
that such costs should be covered by a mechanism if a seller
wishes to diffuse her sale information among the economic
network. However, as far as we know, it is of particular diffi-
culty for the existing market mechanisms to incentivize sell-
ers with costs to share others’ sale information. As a result,
the highest bidder in the network cannot be discovered and
the globally optimal allocation cannot be achieved.
In this paper, we investigate the above customer sharing
problem under an economic network setting in the view of
mechanism design. Taking into consideration the transaction
costs, we propose two mechanisms which can be used to in-
centivize the sellers to become mediators and diffuse other
sellers’ sale information. The first mechanism is an extension
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of the recently proposed information diffusion mechanism
(IDM) [Li et al., 2017]. We show that if the economic net-
work forms a tree structure, the extended mechanism is indi-
vidually rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC), budget bal-
anced (BB) and efficient. Nevertheless, the extended mech-
anism fails to work in general graphs. Therefore, we further
develop a novel mechanism called customer sharing mecha-
nism (CSM). We prove that CSM is IR, IC, BB and efficient
in general cases and the revenue generated by CSM is always
higher than that given by the Vickrey auction.
There exists a rich body of work studying mechanism de-
sign problems that relates to networks. Nevertheless, the
structure of involved networks are usually assumed to be
fixed and prior known to the designer and problems raised
are also essentially different from ours, for instance the cost-
sharing problem for multicast transmissions considered in
[Moulin and Shenker, 2001; Feigenbaum et al., 2001], the
frugal path problem investigated in [Archer and Tardos, 2007;
Elkind et al., 2004] and products procurements studied in
supply networks [Babaioff et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2005].
In terms of promoting information spreading in networks,
previous works can be divided into two categories in gen-
eral. For non-strategic agents settings, agents act according
to the predefined physics rules and the aim is to investigate
the scale of diffusion under various rules and target influential
nodes that can trigger large diffusion cascades in social net-
works [Kempe et al., 2003; Rogers, 2010; Pastor-Satorras et
al., 2015]. In settings with strategic agents, the most widely
studied scenario is to incentivize agents to invite more peo-
ple to accomplish a challenge together−for a few examples,
see [Kleinberg and Raghavan, 2005; Leskovec et al., 2007;
Pickard et al., 2011; Emek et al., 2011; Cebrian et al., 2012].
However, none of them considered an auction setting and
amount of money is needed to compensate the sharers. A
most related work is [Li et al., 2017] where authors proposed
an auction mechanism which not only incentivizes agents to
propagate the sale information to their neighbours in a so-
cial network, but also improves the allocation efficiency and
seller’s revenue comparing with the Vickrey auction.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes the model of the customer sharing problem. Sec-
tion 3 gives a solution in tree-structure economic networks
based on [Li et al., 2017]. To tackle the problem in gen-
eral scenarios, we design a novel mechanism called customer
sharing mechanism (CSM) and analyze its properties in Sec-
tion 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a seller s selling a single commodity in an economic
network. Besides the seller, the economic network includes
n agents denoted by N = {1, 2, · · · , n}, which are divided
into two categories: buyers (customers) who are interested in
buying this commodity and intermediate nodes who are other
sellers or infomediaries. Each intermediate node can only
directly link to her own buyer group and some other inter-
mediate nodes. The buyer groups of intermediate nodes may
not overlap. We assume the buyers do not communicate with
each other, i.e., there are no links between the buyers.
(a) a tree structure       
economic network
(b) a non-tree structure 
economic network
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Figure 1: Two instances of the economic network.
Each buyer i ∈ N assigns a private value bi ≥ 0 to the
commodity − the maximum amount she is willing to pay for
the commodity. Each intermediate node i possesses a private
neighbour set ri ⊆ N with whom i can directly exchange the
sale information. Furthermore, an intermediate node incurs
a cost ci when a trade passes through her hands. We assume
cost ci is known to the seller once intermediate node i partic-
ipates in the auction. Initially, only the seller’s neighbours rs
are informed of the sale.
Figure 1 depicts two examples of the economic network.
The value inside each circle is the buyer’s private valuation
for the commodity. The value (except the seller s) inside each
square is the intermediate node’s cost. For instance, interme-
diate node B suffers a loss of 10 if the winner is buyer F
since a trade from the seller to buyer F must pass through
B’s hands.
Formally, let ti be the private type of agent i. In our setting,
we have
ti =
{
bi if i is a buyer,
ri if i is an intermediate node.
Denote t = (t1, · · · , tn) as the type profile of all agents and
t−i be the type profile of all agents except i. We have t =
(ti, t−i). Let Ti be the type space of agent i and T be the
type profile space of all agents. Specifically, Ti = P(N) for
any intermediate node i where P(N) is the power set of N ,
Ti = R≥0 for any buyer i and T = ×Ti∈N .
The mechanism asks each agent, who is aware of the sale,
to act according to her true type. Denote t′i = b
′
i ∈ Ti as the
reported type of buyer i and t′i = r
′
i ∈ Ti as intermediate node
i’s reported type which means i shares the sale information to
her neighbours in r′i. The reported type of intermediate node
i is limited to P(ri) ⊆ Ti as she is not aware of others who
are not her neighbours. Let t′ = (t′1, · · · , t′n) where t′i = nil
if i has never been informed of the auction or i does not want
to participate.
Definition 1. Given a type report profile t′ of all agents, a
trading chain from seller s to agent i is a sequence of agents
(a1, · · · , ak, ak+1, · · · , ap, i) such that a1 ∈ rs and for 1 <
l ≤ p, al ∈ r′al−1 , i ∈ r′ap and no agent appears twice in the
sequence, i.e., it is a simple path from seller s to agent i.
A trading chain demonstrates how a commodity routes in
the economic network from s to i through each intermedi-
ary ak successively. To completing a trade in an economic
network, the commodity has to go through one or more inter-
mediate nodes if the winner is not a member of the seller’s di-
rect neighbours. Correspondingly, the transaction costs of the
trade is the total costs incurred by these intermediate nodes.
Since an agent who is not informed of the sale cannot partic-
ipate in the auction, not all type report profiles are feasible.
Definition 2. We say a type report profile t′ is feasible if for
all i ∈ N , t′i 6= nil iff there exists a trading chain from seller
s to i following the type reports of t′−i.
A feasible type report profile reflects a practical informa-
tion sharing process where seller s is the initial sharing agent.
In what follows, we only design auction mechanisms under
feasible type report profiles.
Definition 3. Given a feasible type report profile t′, for agent
i with t′i 6= nil, denote LCCi as the trading chain with the
lowest transaction costs from seller s to i, i.e., LCCi =
arg minli∈Li
∑
j∈li\{i} ci where Li is the set of all trading
chains from seller s to i.
For buyer i, LCCi represents the most economic path
when trading a commodity from the seller to i through in-
termediate nodes.
Definition 4. An auction mechanismM = (pi, x) has the fol-
lowing components: an allocation policy pi = {pii}i∈N and
a payment policy x = {xi}i∈N , where pii : T → {−1, 0, 1}
and xi : T → R are the allocation and payment policy for i
respectively.
Given a feasible type report profile t′, pii(t′) = 1 means i
wins the commodity, otherwise pii(t′) = −1 if i is assigned
to the trading chain to the winner and pii(t′) = 0 if i is neither
the winner nor an agent in the trading chain. xi(t′) ≥ 0 indi-
cates that i pays the auctioneer xi(t′), and i receives |xi(t′)|
from the auctioneer if xi(t′) < 0. We say pi is a feasible allo-
cation if for all t′ ∈ T , the mechanism only chooses at most
one buyer as the winner and the agents with pii(t′) 6= 0 form
a trading chain from seller s to the winner. Hereinafter we
only consider feasible allocations.
Let vi(ti, pi(t′)) be the valuation function of agent i under
feasible allocation pi(t′) which denotes her value about the
outcome pi(t′) without considering her payment. In our set-
ting,
vi(ti, pi(t
′)) =

bi pii(t
′) = 1,
−ci pii(t′) = −1,
0 pii(t
′) = 0.
Notice that an intermediate node with pii(t′) = −1 means
that she is a member of the selected trading chain to the win-
ner. Since a cost ci is incurred when trading the commodity,
her value about the allocation is −ci without considering her
payment.
Given a feasible allocation pi(t′), the social welfare of the
allocation is defined as W (pi(t′)) =
∑
i∈N vi(t
′
i, pi(t
′)). Be-
cause only agents in the selected trading chain have non-zero
valuations, we haveW (pi(t′)) =
∑
i∈TCw vi(t
′
i, pi(t
′)) where
w is the winner and TCw is the selected trading chain to w.
Definition 5. An allocation pi is efficient if for any feasible
type report profile t′, pi ∈ arg maxpi′∈ΠW (pi′(t′)) where Π is
the set of all feasible allocations. Denote W ∗(pi(t′)) as the
social welfare under efficient allocation pi.
Equivalently, an auction mechanism (pi, x) with effi-
cient allocation allocates the commodity to buyer m =
arg maxi∈N
∑
j∈LCCi vj(t
′
j , pi(t
′)) and selects LCCm as
the trading chain. In the following, denote the expression∑
j∈LCCi vj(t
′
j , pi(t
′)) by SWi.
Given agent i of truthful type ti, a feasible type report pro-
file t′ and an auction mechanism (pi, x), the utility of i under
the allocation pi(t′) and the payment x(t′) is quasilinear and
is defined as: ui(ti, t′, (pi, x)) = vi(ti, pi(t′))− xi(t′).
A mechanism is individually rational if for each buyer,
her utility is non-negative when she reports her valuation
truthfully, and for each intermediate node, her utility is non-
negative no matter to whom she shares the sale information
and what the others do, i.e., she is not forced to share the sale
information to her neighbours.
Definition 6. A mechanism (pi, x) is individually rational
(IR) if ui(ti, (bi, t′−i), (pi, x)) ≥ 0 for all buyer i and
ui(ti, (r
′
i, t
′′
−i), (pi, x)) ≥ 0 for all intermediate node i, where
(r′i, t
′′
−i) is the feasible type report profile when i reports
r′i ∈ P(ri).
Incentive compatibility in our setting means that for all
buyers and intermediate nodes, reporting valuation truthfully
and spreading the auction information to all neighbours in the
economic network is a dominant strategy.
Definition 7. A mechanism (pi, x) is incentive compatible
(IC) if ui(ti, (ti, t′−i), (pi, x)) ≥ ui(ti, (t′i, t′′−i), (pi, x)) for all
i ∈ N , where (t′i, t′′−i) is the feasible type report profile when
i reports t′i.
Given a feasible type report profile t′ and a mechanism
M = (pi, x), the seller’s revenue generated byM is defined
by the sum of all agents’ payments, denoted by RevM(t′) =∑
i∈N xi(t
′).
Definition 8. A mechanism (pi, x) is weakly budget balanced
if for all feasible type report profile t′ ∈ T , RevM(t′) ≥ 0.
In rest of this paper, we design mechanisms that satisfy
above properties. In order to economize on notations, let
vi(t
′
i, pi(t
′)), W ∗(pi(t′)) be vi(t′i, pi), W
∗(t′) respectively.
3 Information Diffusion Mechanism with
Transaction Costs
The popular VCG mechanism [Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973] can directly apply in our setting. In fact, it is
IR, IC and efficient. One drawback of the VCG mechanism is
that it is not weakly budget balanced and the deficit it suffers
could be linear in |N |−the number of agents. The proof is
trivial and we omit it here. In this section, we first derive
ideas from information diffusion mechanism (IDM) proposed
in [Li et al., 2017] and extends it to economic networks with
costs. In following we show that the extended mechanism
performs well when the underlying economic network forms
a tree structure but fails to be truthful in general scenarios.
We say agent i is agent j’s diffusion critical agent if all
the trading chains started from seller s to j have to pass i.
Intuitively, if i is j’s diffusion critical agent under type report
profile t′, j will not be able to receive the sale information if
i has not joined the auction. Denote di as the set of all agents
who share i as their diffusion critical agent. Let−di = N \di
and t′−di denote the type report profile of agents in −di. In
Figure 1(a), agent E is the shared diffusion critical agent of
agent H , G and herself, therefore we have dE = {E,G,H}.
Definition 9. Given the agents’ type report profile t′, for each
i ∈ N , define Ci = {s1, s2, · · · , sk, i} as the diffusion crit-
ical sequence of i, which is an ordered set of all i’s diffusion
critical agents and the order is determined by the relation
ds1 ⊃ ds2 ⊃, · · · ,⊃ dsk ⊃ di.
An agent in the sequence can only receive the sale infor-
mation if all agents ordered above the agent have received it.
It is worth noting that agent i’s diffusion critical sequence is
the intersection set of all trading chains from the seller to i.
Now we give our mechanism based on the notion of diffusion
critical sequence.
Information Diffusion Mechanism with Transaction
Costs (IDM-TC)
• Given a feasible type report profile t′, allocate the
commodity to buyer m = arg maxi∈NSWi and
choose LCCm as the trading chain (i.e., efficient
allocation with random tie-breaking). Denote the
ordered set {1, 2, · · · ,m− 1,m} by Cm.
• The payment policy for each agent is given as:
W ∗−di −W ∗−di+1 − ci if i ∈ Cm \ {m},
−ci if i ∈ LCCm \ Cm,
W ∗−m +
∑
j∈LCCm\{m} cj if i = m,
0 otherwise,
where W ∗−x denotes W
∗(t′−x) for short.
IDM-TC generalizes the ideas of IDM such that only the
diffusion critical agents of the winner may have a positive
utility. Other non-diffusion-critical agents who are assigned
to the trading chain from seller s to the winner only get a
payoff to cover their costs. To ensure the revenue of the seller,
the transaction costs of the trade are covered by the winner.
We give a running example to show how IDM-TC works in
Figure 1(a). According to the allocation policy of IDM-TC,
buyer H wins the commodity since H = arg maxi∈NSWi.
Buyer H can’t join the auction without the participation of A
or E, therefore H’s diffusion critical agents are {A,E,H}
and CH = {A,E,H} which is the same as LCCH . Accord-
ing to the payment policy, winner H pays W ∗−H + (cA +
cE) = 8 + (0 + 1) = 9. Intermediate node E pays
W ∗−dE −W ∗−dH − cE = −2. In a similar way, A pays −3
and all other agents pay zero. Finally, the revenue of seller
s is 9 + (−2) + (−3) = 4. One can verify that all agents
in Figure 1(a) will act truthfully, that is all buyers will report
their true valuations and all intermediate nodes will share the
sale information to all their neighbours once they are aware
of the auction. In the following, we show that IDM-TC per-
forms well when the underlying economic network forms a
tree structure.
Proposition 1. IDM-TC is efficient, individually rational, in-
centive compatible and weakly budget balanced if the eco-
nomic network forms a tree structure. The revenue of the
seller given by IDM-TC is at least the revenue given by the
Vickrey auction.
Proof. It is obvious that IDM-TC is efficient according to the
allocation policy. Next, we give a sketch for proving IC and
IR properties.
For winner m, a higher bid does not change her utility (≥
0) since she still wins. If she bids a lower value such that
she loses the commodity, her utility becomes zero. For buyer
i who is not the winner, it is no good for her to become a
winner by bidding higher, otherwise she will get a negative
utility since SWi ≤ SWm ⊆ −di. Therefore it is a buyer’s
best strategy to bid truthfully. For any intermediate node i /∈
Cm, no matter to whom she shares the sale information to,
LCCm is not changed since LCCm = Cm ⊆ −di when
the economic network forms a tree structure. This means i is
still not in LCCm and her utility is always zero. If i ∈ Cm,
since W ∗−di is independent of her, i’s utility is maximized
by spreading the auction information to all her neighbours in
which case W−di+1 is maximized. Therefore fully spreading
the sale information is the best reply for intermediates nodes.
The revenue of seller is
∑
i∈N xi(t
′) = W ∗−d1 ≥ 0. Since
rs ⊆ −d1 ∪ {1}, we have W ∗−d1 ≥ b2rs where b2rs is the sec-
ond highest bid in rs (i.e., the revenue given by the Vickrey
auction).
Although IDM-TC is powerful when the economic net-
work forms a tree structure, it fails to be truthful in general
cases. For example, the winner is still buyer H if there is
an edge between intermediate nodes B and E in Figure 1(a).
However, intermediate node A is no longer a diffusion crit-
ical agent of H and she can only obtain a payment of cA
which covers her cost only. To achieve a higher revenue, in-
termediate node A can refuse to share the sale information
to intermediate node E. In this case, the winner becomes
D and intermediate node A becomes D’s diffusion critical
agent. Eventually, she will get a payoff of 1 except her cost
according to the payment policy.
The main reason IDM-TC fails to be truthful is because
non-diffusion-critical agents of the winner have influence on
allocation of the mechanism, which does not happen if there
are no transaction costs. The utility change induces more
complicate propagation strategies for intermediate nodes and
are not fully embodied in IDM-TC. To compensate interme-
diate nodes that incur costs and incentivize them to share the
sale information to all their neighbours in general economic
networks, we will develop new mechanism in the next sec-
tion.
4 Customer Sharing Mechanism
In this section, we design a novel efficient mechanism that is
IR, IC and weakly budget balanced in general economic net-
works. This mechanism, called customer sharing mechanism,
captures the contributions of every agent in an economic net-
work, which is different from IDM-TC that only focuses on
the diffusion critical agents of the winner. Before introducing
our mechanism, we first define an edge-related set for each
intermediate node which plays a vital role in our mechanism.
Definition 10. Given the agents’ type report profile t′, for
each intermediate node i ∈ N , define i’s threshold neigh-
bourhood r∗i
′ as the minimum subset of r′i that makes the win-
ner under efficient allocation changed if i does not share the
sale information to r∗i
′, i.e., r∗i
′ = arg minr′′i ⊆r′i{|r′′i |} where
pim′(r
′
i \ r′′i , t′′−i) = 1 ∧ pim(r′i, t′−i) = 1 ∧m′ 6= m and pi is
an efficient allocation.
Take intermediate node A in Figure 1(b) for an example,
r∗A = {E} ⊂ rA = {C,D,E} is the threshold neighbour-
hood of A since the winner changes to buyer D if A does not
share the sale information to intermediate node E. If i cannot
change the winner through any diffusion strategies, then set
r∗i
′ = r′i. Next, we show that the threshold neighbourhood
of an intermediate node is well defined. For any intermediate
node i that does not belong to LCCm, it is clear that r∗i
′ = r′i
since LCCm cannot be affected by i’s diffusion strategies.
For i ∈ LCCm, we can construct her threshold neighbour-
hood in the following way:
1. initialize r∗i
′ = {∅} and let m be the winner in efficient
allocation.
2. add i’s neighbour j ∈ LCCm to r∗i ′ and remove the
edge (i, j) from the network and move to step 3.
3. if m′ = m and i ∈ LCCm where m′ is the winner
in the new network, then back to step 2; if m′ = m
and i /∈ LCCm, then return i’s threshold neighbourhood
as r′i and terminate this procedure; otherwise, finish the
procedure and return r∗i
′ as i’s threshold neighbourhood.
Clearly, for any j ∈ r∗i ′, the order of deleting edge (i, j)
does not affect the outcome of above procedure since the low-
est cost trading chain from k( 6= j) ∈ r∗i ′ to m is not affected.
Furthermore, the procedure adds only one i’s threshold neigh-
bour in step 2. Therefore the outcome is unique and the output
threshold neighbourhood is minimized. Based on the notion
of threshold neighbourhood, we give our mechanism in what
follows.
Customer Sharing Mechanism (CSM)
• Allocation policy: Given a feasible type report
profile t′, allocate the commodity to buyer m =
arg maxj∈NSWj and trade the commodity along
LCCm (with random tie-breaking).
• Payment policy: The payment policy is defined for
each category of agents as follows.
– for buyer i ∈ N , her payment is defined as:
W ∗−i −W ∗(t′) + vi(t′i, picsm).
– for an intermediate node i, her payment is:
W ∗−di −W ∗−r∗i ′ + vi(t
′
i, pi
csm),
where W ∗−r∗i ′ denotes the maximum social
welfare under feasible type report profile (r′i \
r∗i
′, t′′−i).
Intuitively, in the customer sharing mechanism a buyer
pays the VCG payment which equals to the social welfare
decrease of the others caused by her participation. Each in-
termediate node’s payment is correlated with her threshold
neighbourhood. The peculiar structure in an intermediate
node’s payment motivates her to share the sale information to
all her neighbours. At the same time, seller’s revenue is also
guaranteed. Next, we prove that CSM satisfies all properties
we expect.
Theorem 1. CSM is efficient, individually rational and in-
centive compatible.
Proof. CSM is efficient according to the allocation policy.
Subsequently, we prove that CSM is individually rational and
incentive compatible by two steps as follows.
1. For any buyer i, if she reports bi truthfully, i.e., b′i = bi,
then ui(ti, t′, (pi, x)) = W (t′)∗ −W ∗−i. Since W (t′)∗ is the
optimal social welfare under the constraints that i cannot in-
fluence, if i can misreport b′i to change the allocation to in-
crease vi(ti, picsm) + (W (t′)∗− vi(t′i, picsm)), then it contra-
dicts that W (t′)∗ is the optimal social welfare. Furthermore,
W ∗−i is independent of i and we have W (t
′)∗ ≥W ∗−i. There-
fore, i’s utility is maximised when she reports b′i truthfully.
2. For any intermediate node i, we show that sharing the sale
information to all her neighbours maximizes her utility. If
intermediate node i doesn’t belong to LCCm, then we have
vi(ti, pi
csm) = vi(t
′
i, pi
csm) = 0. Note that LCCm ⊆ −di ⊆
−r∗i ′, then W ∗−di = W ∗−r∗i ′ = SWm = W
∗(t′). Thus her
utility is zero and cannot be affected by her sharing strate-
gies since i /∈ −di. For intermediate node i ∈ LCCm,
her utility is W ∗−r∗i ′ − W
∗
−di by reason of vi(ti, pi
csm) =
vi(t
′
i, pi
csm) = −ci, which is no less than zero because of
−di ⊆ −r∗i ′. Firstly, the latter term W ∗−di is independent of
r′i since i /∈ −di and we only consider how the former term is
affected by different sharing strategies of intermediate node
i. When intermediate node i misreports her type as r′i ⊆ ri,
there are two possible outcomes. If the winner has changed
to another buyer, then we must have r∗i ⊂ ri \ r′i since r∗i
is the minimum subset of ri that makes the current winner
changed. Notice that the threshold neighbourhood r∗i
′ is the
set of agents to whom intermediate node i does not share the
sale information when she reports r′i ⊆ ri, therefore we get−r∗i ′ ⊂ −r∗i . If the winner is not changed, then we have
r∗i ⊆ (r∗i ′ ∪ (ri \ r′i)) which also means that −r∗i ′ ⊂ −r∗i . In
either case, we have −r∗i ′ ⊆ −r∗i and W ∗−r∗i ′ ≤ W
∗
−r∗i . Thus
sharing the sale information to all neighbours maximizes an
intermediate node’s utility.
Therefore, CSM is individually rational and incentive com-
patible, that is biding truthfully and spreading the sale infor-
mation to all their neighbours is a dominant strategy for all
agents in the economic network.
The reason of truthfulness of an intermediate node is due to
the fact that the more neighbours an intermediate node shares
the sale information to, the smaller her threshold neighbour-
hood will become. Therefore, her utility is maximized when
she shares the sale information to all her neighbours because
W ∗−r∗i ′ is maximized.
It is worth noting that the identification of threshold neigh-
bourhood is a key component in the proof of incentive com-
patibility. Furthermore, the threshold neighbourhood also
plays a crucial role in the budget balanced property of CSM.
Lemma 1. Given a feasible type report profile t′, assume
buyer m wins the commodity and LCCm = {l1, l2, · · · , lq =
m}. For any intermediate node li ∈ LCCm, if the winner
becomesm′ 6= m when li’s sharing strategy changes from r′li
to r′li \ r∗li ′, then {li+1, li+2, · · · , lq} ∩ LCCm′ = ∅.
Proof. Assume there is an intermediate node lj ∈
{li+1, li+2, · · · , lq} ∩ LCCm′ . Denote the lowest transac-
tion costs from seller s to lj as x, lj to buyer m as y and lj to
buyer m′ as z under type report profile (r′li \ r∗li ′, t′′−li). Since
m′ is the new winner, we have bm′ − z − x > bm − y − x
which means bm′ − z > bm − y which contradicts the fact
that LCCm is the trading chain with lowest transaction costs
from seller s to buyer m under type report profile t′.
It is straightforward that intermediate node i’s utility is
zero if her diffusion strategies cannot change the current
winner according to the payment policy of CSM, in which
case r∗i
′ = r′i. And for the intermediate nodes who can
change current winner to another one, {li+1, li+2, · · · , lq} ∩
LCCm′ = ∅ means that LCCm′ is independent of the
agent lk ∈ {li+1, li+2, · · · , lq}. Therefore we have
LCCm′ ⊆ −dlk which leads to W ∗−r∗i ′ = SWm′ =∑
i∈LCCm′ vi(t
′
i, pi
csm) ≤ ∑i∈−dlk vi(t′i, picsm) = W ∗−dlk .
Based on this observation, we show CSM is budget balanced.
Theorem 2. CSM is weakly budget balanced and the revenue
of the seller is no less than W ∗−d1∗ where 1
∗ is the first agent
in LCCm with r∗1∗ 6= r1∗ .
Proof. Denote the ordered sequence LCC∗m ={1∗, 2∗, · · · , k∗} ⊆ LCCm as the set of intermediate
nodes with r∗i 6= ri. For an intermediate node that doesn’t
belong to LCC∗m, her payment is vi(ti, pi
csm) because of
W ∗−di = W
∗
−ri = W
∗
−r∗i . Therefore the revenue of seller
Revcsm is given by:∑
i∈N
xi(t) =
∑
i∈LCCm
xi(t)
=
∑
i∈LCC∗m
(W ∗−di −W ∗−r∗i ) +W
∗
−m −W ∗(t)
+
∑
i∈LCCm
vi(ti, pi
csm)
=
∑
i∈LCC∗m
(W ∗−di −W ∗−r∗i ) +W
∗
−m
= W ∗−d1∗ +
∑
i∈LCC∗m\{1∗}
(−W ∗−r∗i +W
∗
−di+1),
where −dk∗+1 is the set of −m. According to Lemma 1, we
have that for any intermediate node i∗ ∈ LCC∗m, (i+ 1)∗ /∈
LCCm′ where m′ is the winner under feasible type report
profile (ri∗ \r∗i∗ , t′−i∗). This means that LCCm′ ⊆ −d(i+1)∗ .
Therefore W ∗−dj+1 ≥W ∗−r∗j for all j ∈ LCC∗m \ {1∗}, which
leads to
∑
i∈LCC∗m\{1∗}(−W ∗−r∗i + W ∗−di+1) ≥ 0. That is,
Revcsm = W ∗−d1∗ + δ ≥ W ∗−d1∗ ≥ b2rs ≥ 0 where δ is a
non-negative value.
We run CSM in Figure 1(b) to end this section. By the
allocation policy, identify the winner in Figure 1(b) as buyer
H = arg maxj∈NSWj with LCCH = {A,E,H}. Then
determine the threshold neighbourhood for each intermedi-
ate node in LCCH : r∗A = {E} and r∗E = {H}. Accord-
ing to the payment policy of CSM, xA = W ∗−dA −W ∗−r∗A +
vi(ti, pi
csm) = 4−7+(−0) = −3. In a similar way, we have
xE = 7−8+(−1) = −2 and xH = 8−9+10 = 9. All other
agents who don’t belong to LCCH pay zero. Therefore, the
revenue of the seller is−3+(−2)+9 = 4 which is four times
of the revenue given by the Vickrey auction.
5 Conclusions
To increase seller’s revenue and improve allocation efficiency
in economic networks with costs, we design a novel auc-
tion mechanism called customer sharing mechanism. In this
mechanism, all the sellers and infomediaries are incentivized
to diffuse the auction information to all their neighbours and
all the customers are incentivized to bid truthfully. As a con-
sequence, all the sellers can share customers to each other and
the commodity of each seller will be allocated globally, both
the revenue and efficiency are significantly improved compar-
ing with the Vickrey auction in which agents have no incen-
tives to share information.
One premise in the model was that the costs of interme-
diate nodes are assumed to be known. In fact, public costs
widely exist in real-world. In e-markets, online platforms
usually charge a fixed and public-known commission when
dealing with a trade. In freight systems, the costs are con-
sumed resources for shipping the commodity. When selling
privacy datasets via a computer network, the costs are elec-
tricity consumption when handling the datasets. These afore-
mentioned costs can be easily estimated and verified in prac-
tice. Additionally, when the costs are also private informa-
tion for intermediate nodes, one cannot design mechanisms
that satisfy all the good properties simultaneously. Consider
a simple network: one seller, one intermediate node with a
private cost and one customer with private valuation consti-
tute a line. Since the intermediate node can affect the alloca-
tion of the commodity by changing her diffusion strategies,
it is clear that we can reduce this setting to a bilateral trade.
According to Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem [Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983], no truthful, IR and efficient mechanism
is budget balanced.
There are several directions for future researches. In this
paper, we give one solution for customer sharing problem,
however, to maximize the seller’s revenue, we need to char-
acterize the conditions for all truthful mechanisms in the eco-
nomic network. Moreover, the seller in our paper has only
one commodity for sale, it is of great interest to design mech-
anisms for selling multiple commodities. Without consider-
ing costs, a generalized IDM is proposed for selling k homo-
geneous items via social networks where each buyer wants
at most one item [Zhao et al., 2018]. The proposed mech-
anism can also be further implemented by using techniques
from Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD)
[Feigenbaum and Shenker, 2002; Feigenbaum et al., 2005].
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